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Farmland Ownership Policy: Technical Paper 
Peter Bell 
 
Abstract: In this paper I develop a theoretical model to analyze policy 
that restricts who can own land.  I briefly review research related to such 
policy in Saskatchewan, Canada, and identify a standard supply-demand 
model that I extend in several ways.  First, I replicate results for how 
policy affects prices and develop new results for how policy affects 
social welfare using comparative statics.  Second, I extend the model to a 
dynamic setting where demand curves change over time and show that 
policy can affect price changes in variety of ways, which I refer to as 
comparative dynamics.  Third, I conduct a series of simulations to 
compare my model and a standard model.  I establish stylistic facts about 
data on price levels, differences, and ratios generated by the different 
models. 
Keywords:  Farmland, ownership, policy, demand and supply, 
comparative statics, comparative dynamics, simulation 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is written for a technical audience of mathematical economists.  The results I 
describe provide rigour to claims made in another paper that develops a thought experiment for 
policy analysis (Bell, 2014).  Both papers are part of my research agenda on farmland ownership.  
To begin, I recognize that farmland ownership is receiving much deserved attention and offer 
homage to the late Andro Linklater with an extended quote from his recent book, which explores 
land ownership as one of the most important cultural forces in human history. 
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 I began work on this book in 2009 as an attempt to understand the circumstances of the 
economic crash.  A tug at the broken banking thread pulled out the political failure of 
regulation, and that in turn led to the Austrian school of economics, and the particular 
meaning that Frederich Hayek and his colleagues gave to property and liberty.  Thus step 
by step the focus on the book turned to [land] ownership… If you concentrate on how a 
place is owned, however, the perspective changes.  As this book demonstrates, matters of 
laws, of rights, and of politics become crucial, taking precedence over economics.  
(Linklater, 2013, p. 398-399) 
The economic research literature on farmland ownership restrictions in Saskatchewan 
begins with Jared Carlberg (2002), an award-winning paper that Carlberg wrote during his PhD.  
The paper uses auction theory to predict that such policy causes lower prices because it reduces 
the number of bidders at auction.  He uses a Present Value (PV) statistical model to test this 
prediction using data on average farmland prices in Saskatchewan (SK) and Alberta (AB).  The 
model allows each province to have a change in the intercept term after the policy begins and the 
null hypothesis is that the intercepts are equal.  Thus, the model can test if prices in SK were 
lower than AB after the policy.  Carlberg uses a supplementary statistical approach that tests for 
a structural break (downward jump) in the ratio of prices (SK/AB) after the policy.  Both 
statistical methods search for policy effects in price levels and both methods find that the policy 
has a statistically and economically insignificant effect on prices.  This is an influential paper 
that led to other published papers and consulting reports on the topic, which reflects some 
success for Carlberg as a young academic. 
Another influential paper on Saskatchewan farmland policy is written by Shon Ferguson, 
Hartley Furtan, and Jared Carlberg (2006).  The paper uses a demand and supply model in 
graphical form, which I extend with further graphical analysis and an algebraic version.  
Ferguson et al. use the supply-demand model to perform welfare analysis and they find that the 
policy always causes a net social cost, which raises a puzzling question: why start the policy if it 
imposes a net cost on society?  Ferguson et al. use the concept of endogenous policy and 
regulatory capture to resolve this question.  They point out that, even though the policy is not in 
the best interest of the province, it is in the best interest of voters and politicians can exploit this 
for success in elections. 
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Although the potential for regulatory capture in farmland ownership is a serious concern, 
Ferguson et al. do not claim that the Province acted in bad faith because their statistical results 
suggest the effect of policy on prices is insignificant.  Ferguson et al. use a popular statistical 
method known as Two Stage Least Squares to establish this result.  A key variable in their 
theoretical model is the restrictiveness of policy, which is not observable.  They use average 
farm size in SK to serve as a proxy for restrictiveness of policy, which “assumes that the average 
farm size in Saskatchewan is what the average nonresident would choose in a free market” 
(Ferguson et al., 2006, p. 63).  As in Carlberg (2002), Ferguson et al. (2006) search for evidence 
of the effects of policy in price levels.  However, the method in Ferguson et al. reflects progress 
in the literature because it allows for the effect of policy to vary over time in a non-trivial 
fashion.  
In the final chapter of the book titled Farmland Prices and Government Policy, Carlberg 
and Furtan address the two goals of the SK policy: to cause lower prices to help new entrants and 
to stop the decreases to rural populations (2003, p.391).  They use quasi-experimental methods 
similar to Carlberg (2002) and find that policy did not achieve either goal.  Although this seems 
to be a clear conclusion, other chapters in the book show that economic research on farmland 
prices is notoriously controversial.   For example, Philip Raup (2003) provides a careful 
historical account of farmland as a local, disagreggated concept, which conflicts with standard 
economic models and government statistics that are highly aggregated.  In fact, the model I 
present here is highly aggregated and suffers from some of Raup’s criticisms.  I hope to address 
such challenges in the future by using big data on individual transactions in farmland.  In another 
chapter, Calum Turvey (2003) addresses the controversy around the PV model – the model 
generates consistent errors when tested against real farmland prices.  Turvey uses the concept of 
a real option to augment the PV framework, which provides a way to include uncertainty into PV 
calculations.  These chapters show that there is ongoing, active research on farmland.  I 
encourage interested readers to consider updating results from prior research on SK policy with 
larger data series currently available.   
In this paper I provide technical details for my theoretical model of farmland ownership 
policy.  This model provides new insights into the welfare effects of policy and the ways that 
policy can impact price changes.  In Section 2 I replicate familiar results from the literature and 
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introduce a welfare measure that opens new discussion around the net effect of the policy.  In 
Section 3 I extend my model to a dynamic setting and show that policy can impact price 
differences in equilibrium.  In Section 4 I conduct simulation experiments to compare my model 
and the PV model.  I show how the effect of policy can appear in price levels, differences, and 
ratio of treatment to control in each model.  The paper also has three appendices.  In the first 
appendix I derive an important algebraic result.  The second appendix contains a series of 
technical diagrams that I use to explain important parts of paper visually.  The third appendix is a 
spreadsheet that allows readers to explore how I preformed the simulations I use in Section 4. 
 
2.  Comparative Statics 
 
The model I use is a basic demand and supply model for market equilibrium.  The model 
applies to any situation where one group of buyers is forbidden from participating in a market.  
Thus, the building blocks for the model are the downward-sloping demand functions for two 
groups: domestic buyers (QD(P)) and foreign buyers (QF(P)).  I assume the supply is perfectly 
inelastic (constant) for all prices, which I denote it as Q̃.  I solve market equilibrium based on 
total demand and supply.  In an open market, total demand is sum of domestic and foreign 
demand (QO(P)) as in Equation (2.1), which economists refer to as a horizontal sum of demand 
(Ferguson et al., 2006, p. 61).  The total demand in a closed market (QC) is just domestic 
demand, Equation (2.2). 
(2.1) QO(P) = QD(P) + QF(P) 
(2.2) QC(P) = QD(P) 
To solve the market clearing price, I use total demand and supply.  I start with domestic 
and foreign demand, combine them, and then solve equilibrium prices.  This adds an extra step 
compared with solving equilibrium prices in a model with one demand curve, where I can solve 
prices using the inverse demand function.  The inverse demand for total demand in an open 
market (QO(P)) may not be continuously differentiable (it may be defined piecewise).  This extra 
step in my model introduces a risk that the mathematical model produces economically 
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unrealistic results, such as negative quantity demand for certain prices.  Therefore, I am careful 
in my analysis to check equilibrium conditions and avoid such a scenario.  I denote prices as 
PO: QO(PO) = Q̃ for an open market and PC: QC(PC) = Q̃ for a closed market.   
 
Result 1:  Policy causes lower prices (PO > PC).   
Proof:  I use a proof by contradiction.   Suppose PO < PC.  Then  
QO(PC) = Q̅ + QF(PC) > Q̅ because QF(P) > 0.  But PO < PC implies that QO(PO) > QO(PC) 
because 
dQO
dP
< 0.  It follows that QO(PO) > Q̅, which is a contradiction.  □ 
 
Next I develop analysis for the effect of policy on social welfare.  As in in Equations (2.3) 
and (2.4), I denote CSD,O as the consumer surplus for domestic demand in an open market and 
CSF,O.  In contrast to the proof for Result 1, I assume that there is a cut-off price where quantity 
of demand for each group goes to zero.  I denote these prices as PD̅̅̅̅ : QD(PD̅̅̅̅ ) = 0 and 
PF̅̅ ̅: QF(PF̅̅ ̅) = 0. 
(2.3) CSD,O = ∫ QD
PD̅̅ ̅̅
PO
(p)dp  
(2.4) CSF,O = ∫ QF
PF̅̅ ̅̅
PO
(p)dp  
Definition of consumer surplus for domestic and foreign buyers in closed market given in 
Equation (2.5) and (2.6).  Notice that foreigners generate zero consumer surplus in closed market 
because not allowed to participate.  
(2.5) CSD,C = ∫ QD
PD̅̅ ̅̅
PC
(p)dp  
(2.6) CSF,C = 0 
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A careful reader will notice that I use integrals over price (dp) here rather than quantity 
(dq).  Standard analysis often uses quantity-integrals with inverse demand functions but the price 
integrals are better suited to my analysis because I am using demand functions.   
 
Result 2: Policy increases welfare for domestic buyers and decreases welfare for foreign. 
Proof:  I use a proof by construction.  First, I show that policy benefit domestic demand. 
CSD,O − CSD,C = ∫ QD
PD̅̅ ̅̅
PC
(p)dp − ∫ QD
PD̅̅ ̅̅
PO
(p)dp = ∫ QD
PO
PC
(p)dp.  And ∫ QD
PO
PC
(p)dp >
0 because PO > PC and QD(p) > 0 ∀p. 
Second, I show that policy hurt foreign demand.  CSF,C − CSF,C = − ∫ QF
PF̅̅ ̅̅
PC
(p)dp.  And 
− ∫ QF
PF̅̅ ̅̅
PC
(p)dp < 0 because PF̅̅ ̅ > PO and QF(p) > 0 ∀p.  □ 
 
In a companion paper, I develop a hypothetical case for SK policy based on a Net Benefit 
Test that I describe as follows “the policy passes the Net Benefit Test when domestic demand is 
larger than foreign; the policy fails the Test when foreign demand is larger than domestic” (Bell, 
2014, p. 5).  This Test is based on the change in the welfare measure I describe below.  The 
welfare measure is defined by Equation (2.7), it has index I that denotes an open market (I = O) 
or a closed one (I = C).  The effect of the policy on welfare is defined by Equation (2.8) and my 
Net Benefit Test is based on the sign of ∆W: when ∆W > 0 the policy passes Net Benefit Test 
and when ∆W < 0 the policy fails the Test. 
(2.7) WI = CSD,I + CSF,I 
(2.8)  ∆W = WC − WO 
My welfare measure is different from Ferguson et al. (2006) because I exclude producer 
surplus.  I exclude it because no-one makes farmland, so no-one creates producer surplus.  We 
can count the surplus associated with supplying farmland as a resource rent, but then the welfare 
measure suggests the policy always imposes a net cost on society.  My measure finds that policy 
can have net benefit or cost, depending on conditions, which is useful from a modelling 
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perspective because it provides new way to analyze the policy.  However, this discussion is part 
of a much broader dialogue around how to model farmland within a neoclassical economic 
framework – see further discussion in the book Farmland Prices and Government Policy. 
(2.9) ∆W = ( 
(Q̅+aD−aF)(Q̅−aD+aF)
4b
) 
Equation (2.9) is an explicit result for the Net Benefit Test derived under simplified 
conditions.  The derivation is provided in an appendix.  In simple terms, the proof assumes linear 
demand curves with same slope in domestic and foreign but different intercept terms.  Again, the 
result has to be used carefully to avoid making unrealistic intermediary results.  I use Equation 
(2.9) to establish that policy can have net benefit when domestic demand larger than foreign 
demand, which is an important part of my Net Benefit Test. 
 
Result 3:  Policy has net benefit when domestic demand larger than foreign (∆W >
0 ↔ QD(p) > QF(p) ∀p. 
Proof: I use a proof by construction.  I assume linear demands with equal slopes.  When I 
say domestic demand is larger than foreign, this means aD > aF within my model.  This implies 
that (Q̅ + aD − aF) > 0, which ensures the first term in Equation (2.9) is positive. 
To ensure that the second term in Equation (2.9) is positive, I assume that supply satisfies 
conditions that mean domestic and foreign demand are both positive in equilibrium  
(aD − aF < Q̅ < aD + aF).  The lower bound on Q̅ implies that aD < Q̅ + aF and 0 < Q̅ − aD +
aF, which is the second term in Equation (2.9).   
Since each term in (2.9) is positive, ∆W > 0 and the policy has a net benefit.  Note: I provide a 
graphical description of this result in Figure 2 of the graphical appendix. □ 
 
Result 4:  Policy has net cost when foreign demand is larger than domestic. 
Proof:  I demonstrate this result in Figure 2 of the graphical appendix. 
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Results 3 and 4 give technical evidence to support my claim that the policy has a net 
benefit when domestic demand is larger than foreign and a net cost when foreign demand is 
larger than domestic.  Furthermore, the results allow me to refine my language around the Test.  
According to my graphical example of Result 4, the policy has a net cost when foreign demand is 
larger at all prices and more inelastic to price changes than domestic demand.  To see this 
inelasticity, look to the bottom pane of Figure 2: the dashed line is steeper than the solid line at 
the constant quantity of supply.  According to my analytic proof of Result 3, the policy has a net 
cost when domestic demand is larger at all prices.  I do not need the extra assumption of 
inelasticity to establish Result 3 because it is an easier result within my model. 
  
3.  Comparative Dynamics 
 
To develop further results, I assume the demand curves are linear.  I allow domestic and 
foreign demand curves to differ based on the total size of demand (aD, aF) but not their marginal 
behaviour or elasticity (b).  However, the assumptions are helpful for analyzing how policy 
affects price changes.  
(3.1) QD(P) = aD − bP 
(3.2) QF(P) = aF − bP 
The equilibrium prices in open and closed markets are given in Equations (3.3) and (3.4). 
(3.3)  PO =
1
2b
(aD + aF − Q̃) 
(3.4)  PC =
1
b
(aD − Q̃)  
To analyze price changes, I allow the intercepts to change over time.  I introduce this 
assumption in Equation (3.5) and (3.6).  This allows me to compare price changes in an open and 
closed market, which I refer to as comparative dynamics in reference to the classic technique 
known as comparative statics.   
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(3.5)  P = f(aD(t), aF(t), b) 
(3.6)  
dP
dt
=
df
daD
daD
dt
+  
df
daF
daF
dt
 
Equation (3.6) provides a new insight that I discuss further in Figure 3 of the graphical 
appendix.  Basically, price changes in an open market are driven by two factors whereas they are 
only driven by one factor in a closed market.  The relative sizes of the two factors determines the 
difference between price changes in an open and closed market. 
To make the price changes explicit, I calculate the derivatives of equilibrium prices in 
Equations (3.3) and (3.4).  The price changes for an open market and closed market are given in 
Equation (3.7) and (3.8). 
(3.7)  
dPO
dt
=
1
2b
(
daD
dt
+
daF
dt
) 
(3.8) 
dPC
dt
=
1
b
(
daD
dt
) 
I combine the two equations for price changes to create a new term: the difference in 
differences.  This single term is defined in Equation (3.9).  It describes how policy affects the 
price changes – it is the gap between the growth rates in an open and closed market.  When the 
gap is positive, the closed market is becoming underpriced relative to the open market.  Hence, it 
is useful for assessing the basic research question: does the policy cause lower prices? 
(3.9) 
dPO
dt
−
dPC
dt
=
1
2b
(
daD
dt
−
daF
dt
) 
In Figure 4 of the graphical appendix I discuss eight different ways that policy can affect 
prices changes.  The policy can cause prices in the closed market to lag behind the open one or to 
accelerate ahead, either in a bull or a bear market.  This is a bold new set of results that can 
advance the literature on this topic.  However, the results have a possible weakness because they 
can generate almost any type of behaviour.  The results do not have stark, testable predictions; 
rather, they can account for any type of market action.  
 
Ownership Policy Technical Paper  Page 10 of 15 
© Peter Bell, 2014 
In order to make my results described in Figure 4 operational, I focus on two types of 
behaviour: shift and dampen.  I created the name for each myself based on the intuition behind 
them.  The shift effect refers to a situation where price changes are lower in a closed market than 
an open market: the policy causes price changes to shift downwards.  This implies that the 
difference in differences will be positive and price levels in the closed market will be lower.  The 
shift effect is related to Carlberg’s (2002) idea that policy causes lower prices, but it is 
articulated in terms of price changes rather than price levels. 
The dampen effect refers to a situation where price changes in a closed market are smaller 
in absolute value than an open market.  Price changes in an open and closed market always have 
the same sign, but the closed region is always smaller in absolute value.  In this case the 
difference in differences can be positive or negative.  The dampen effect can be described as a 
situation where policy reduces sensitivity (beta) of farmland prices to some fundamental risk 
factor that drives prices. 
 
4. Simulation Experiments 
 
In this section I compare different types of data generated by my model and the standard 
PV model.  First I specify the models and then discuss simulations of price levels, differences, 
and ratios. Each model allows me to control how data is generated separately for open and closed 
markets, before and after the policy starts.  I use the simulations to establish stylized facts about 
the types of behaviour that each model can generate. 
I begin with the standard PV model described by Carlberg (2002).  The model is expressed 
in terms of price levels and allows for a change in the intercepts after the policy starts.  I describe 
the model using my own notation in Equations (4.1) to (4.4). 
(4.1)  PO,B,T = αT + εO,T 
(4.2)  PC,B,T = αT + εC,T 
(4.3)  PO,A,T = αT + εO,T 
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(4.4)  PC,A,T = αT − δ + εC,T 
Since I use my own notation here, I discuss the variables in detail.  The price levels PI,J,K 
have three superscripts: I denotes region, O for open, C for closed; J denotes whether policy has 
started or not, B for before policy, A for after policy; and K denotes time.  I denote the trend for 
price levels as αT; I assume the open and closed market have the same trend to make the 
experimental set up clean (only difference is presence of policy).  I allow each region to have 
separate noise term, denoted εO,T for open region and εC,T for closed.  The noise can have an 
arbitrary structure, but I pick uniform distribution with low volatility because it produces 
stationary first differences – an important assumption for PV model. 
The key idea of Carlberg (2002) is that policy causes lower prices.  I build this idea into the 
model with a dummy variable in the intercept for the closed region after the policy, which is δ in 
Equation (4.4). Since the dummy is positive (δ > 0), the average price in the policy region jumps 
downwards after the policy starts.  Technically, Carlberg allows each region to have a separate 
dummy after the policy starts but I assume the open region has zero jump to make the 
experiment clean (only difference is presence of policy).  It is possible to conduct further 
simulations in this vein in order to explore statistical power of the regression method. 
The results of simulation using Carlberg’s model are provided in Figure 5 of the graphic 
appendix.  The simulation is meant to resemble situation where prices have an increasing trend, 
low levels of noise, and a large drop in prices after the start of policy.  Details on the simulation 
are provided in the spreadsheet appendix.  There are several important things to recognize about 
the simulations.  First, the policy has a one-time, permanent effect on price levels.  Second, the 
policy effect appears as an outlier in price differences – a very large price decrease in the period 
when the policy starts.  Third, the ratio of prices drops after policy and then normalizes slowly 
(prices have an increasing trend, so the size of the jump caused by policy becomes relatively 
smaller over time).  This set of facts is familiar in a hyper-rational economic framework where 
agents can discount the future into the single instant when the change happens, it is a useful 
baseline to show how policy can affect equilibrium prices. 
Next I discuss my model.  The order of operation in my simulations is different from 
Carlberg’s model because I start with price differences, then calculate price levels and the ratio.  
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With Carlberg’s model, I started with price levels and then calculate price differences and the 
ratio.  The intuition for my model is that open and closed markets have the same trend growth 
rates before the policy (cointegration) but not after the policy.  After the policy, the closed region 
is different somehow – I make this statement precise using the shift and dampen effects. 
The first case I present with my model is the shift effect.  Recall that shift means that 
policy causes price changes to be lower than they would otherwise.  I describe this model in 
Equations (4.5)—(4.8). 
(4.5)   
dPO,B,T
dt
= αT + εO,T 
(4.6)   
dPC,B,T
dt
= αT + εC,T 
(4.7)   
dPO,A,T
dt
= αT + εO,T 
(4.8)   
dPC,A,T
dt
= αT − δ + εC,T 
I denote price differences as 
dPI,J,K
dt
 where superscripts have same meaning as before (region 
indicator, policy indicator, time index).  I assume the open and closed market both have the same 
trend growth rates, denoted αT.  I allow each region to have a separate noise term, denoted εO,T 
for open region and εC,T for closed.  Again, I assume the noise have a uniform distribution with 
low volatility.  The shift effect means that price changes are lower for the closed market after the 
policy, which I build into the model with a change in the intercept for the closed market after the 
policy begins, the δ in Equation (4.8) (δ > 0). 
Results of my simulation using the shift effect are described in Figure 6 of the graphical 
appendix.  Again, the simulation is meant to represent a bull market where the policy causes 
lower price changes and details are provided in the appendix.  First, notice that policy marks a 
break point where price levels in the open and closed market diverge.  They diverge at an instant 
and head away from each other for the remainder of the simulation.  Second, there is also a break 
point seen in the price differences: after the policy starts, price changes in the closed market are 
lower than the open one (by construction).  Third, the price ratio has a break point at the policy 
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start date.  After the policy starts, the ratio trends downward over the entire simulation.  These 
three observations are very different from the simulations with Carlberg’s model.  My model 
shows the ability to produce prices where the effect of policy grows larger over time, which is a 
new stylized facts for the literature. 
The second case I present with my model is the dampen effect.  Recall that the dampen 
effect means that policy decreases the absolute value of price changes.  The equations for price 
changes in this model are the same as the shift case, except for the closed region after the policy.  
Therefore, I replace Equation (4.8) with (4.9).  For my simulations with the dampen effect, the 
trend growth rate (αT) in the closed region is a fraction of the growth rate in the open region.  
This fraction (0 < δ < 1) makes it so that price changes in the closed region have the same sign 
as the open region but are smaller in absolute value.  
(4.9)   
dPC,A,T
dt
= δ αT + εC,T 
Results of my simulation using the dampen effect are described in Figure 7 of the graphical 
appendix.  This time the simulations are meant to represent a bear market, where prices steadily 
fall.  I picked this scenario to show that policy can cause higher prices.  First, notice that policy 
marks break a point in price levels.  After the policy starts, prices in closed market fall less 
quickly than the open market; dampening price changes during a bear market means less price 
decreases.  Second, there is clear evidence that price changes in the closed market are smaller 
than the open market after the policy begins (by construction).  Third, the price ratio actually 
increases over time.  Again, simulations from my model produce a series of new insights for the 
literature. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I use an old model to generate a new set of results.  The model is a classic one 
for general equilibrium with multiple sources of demand and supply.  The new results show how 
the policy can have a net benefit or net cost depending on all demand curves depending on the 
relative sizes of those who are allowed in or excluded from the market by government policy. 
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One important result for my research agenda is the existence of the conditions for my Net 
Benefit Test.  I show that the policy has a net benefit when domestic demand is larger than 
foreign demand and the policy has a net cost when foreign demand is larger (and more inelastic) 
than domestic demand.  I prove the net benefit result under general conditions using a technical 
result derived in an appendix to this paper.  I demonstrate the net cost result using graphical 
analysis in Figure 2 of the graphical appendix.  These results need further development before 
they should be used for government policy, but they provide evidence to support my analysis that 
suggests policy changes may be related to increasing activity from farmland investment funds in 
SK (Bell, 2014).    
Another important result for my research agenda is the fact that policy can affect price 
changes.  My theoretical model provides new insights that go beyond the conventional claim: 
policy causes lower prices (Carlberg, 2002).  In my model, policy affects price changes in a way 
that accumulates over time, unlike the standard model that requires an instantaneous adjustment.  
The policy can cause several different types of effects in my model, which leads me to introduce 
the shift and dampen effects to build structure into my model.  Going forward, I will be careful to 
keep “gentlemanly distance” between my assumptions and results. 
The next stages of my modelling will comprise empirical applications of my model.  To 
begin, I compare the standard PV model and my new model in simulation.  Simulation provides 
a way to analyze a model in an almost visceral manner – we see examples of paths of data that 
can be generated by the models and can compare between them.  This is not yet a formalized 
statistical procedure, but it is useful for establishing stylized facts.  I simulate price levels, 
differences, and ratio of open to closed prices for the standard model and my model with either 
the shift or dampen effect.  For the standard model, the policy has a one-time effect on prices, 
which stands out as an outlier in price changes.  The policy causes an instant jump in the price 
ratio, which shrinks over time as prices increase.  In contrast, my model produces large and 
persistent effects on price levels, differences, and the ratio.  I show that the price ratio can 
decrease or increase in different cases, which is contrary to an important assumption in prior 
research (for example: Carlberg & Furtan, 2003, p. 392).  Although I have not included results of 
estimation, it is possible to reconcile my simulation framework with the estimation framework 
used by prior researchers and generate conventional estimates of policy effects with my model. 
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Appendix to Farmland Ownership Policy Paper: 
Proof of Welfare Result 
 
Peter Bell 
 
In this appendix, I provide derivation of result:    ( 
  ̅         ̅       
  
).  I use this result to establish 
that the policy has a net benefit when domestic demand is larger than foreign demand.   
 
To begin, I provide definitions for the terms involved in the social welfare calculations.  
1.   ̅̅ ̅̅    (  ̅̅ ̅̅ )      ̅̅ ̅   (  ̅̅ ̅)    
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5.                    
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I establish the proof under specific assumptions about the demand curves (both are linear with same 
slopes).  These are reflected in the following results concerning market outcomes. 
7.              
8.              
9.    
    ̅
 
 denotes price in a closed market 
10.    
       ̅
  
 denotes price in an open market 
11.   ̅̅ ̅  
  
 
 denotes price that drives foreign demand to zero 
 
Over the next few equations, I derive a formula for the change in domestic welfare caused by policy. 
12.      ∫   
  
  
      
13.       
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Over the next few equations, I derive a formula for the change in foreign welfare caused by policy. 
19.       ∫   
  ̅̅ ̅̅
  
      
20.       
 
 
      
  ̅̅ ̅̅  
21.     (
           ̅
  
)  
 
 
[(
  
 
)
 
 (
       ̅
  
)
 
 ] 
22.     (
    ̅   
  
)  
 
 
[(
 (  )
 
   
)  (
(  )
 
 (  )
 
   ̅             ̅     ̅
   
) ] 
23.   (
 (  )
 
     ̅      
  
)  
( (  )
 
 (  )
 
   ̅             ̅     ̅)
  
 
24.   
(  )
 
     ̅       (  )
 
   ̅       ̅
  
 
 
It follows that: 
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This establishes the intended result. 
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To conclude, I demonstrate the result with a numerical example.   
I assume that                       ̅   .  Then it follows that        ̅̅ ̅       
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So           
  
 
 
 
 
     This provides an example of a market where the policy has a net benefit 
when            .   
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This diagram
shows the 
two sources
of demand 
in the market.
This diagram shows how the policy causes lower prices
(domestic demand is larger than foreign for illustration).
Figure 1: Static Effects of Policy on Prices
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Domestic Demand 
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Open Market
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This diagram shows how the policy has net cost 
when foreign demand is larger than domestic.
This diagram shows how the policy has net benefit 
when domestic demand is larger than foreign.
Figure 2: Welfare Effects of Policy
Foreign Surplus
destroyed by Policy
Foreign Surplus
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Domestic Surplus 
created by Policy
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This shows how total demand changes in an open market when 
foreign demand grows faster than domestic. In this case, 
policy reduces (dampens) the price increase.
This diagram shows how total demand changes in a closed 
market.  
The market only changes from growth in domestic demand.
Figure 3: Effects of Policy on Price Dynamics
Price
Quantity
Before
After
A
B
A – Growth in demand due only 
to domestic growth.
B – Additional growth caused by 
growth in foreign demand.
Quantity
Price
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Region B
Region A
Region C
Region DRegion E
Region F
Region G
Region H
Figure 4: Different Ways Policy can affect Price Changes
Region Effect on Price Changes Explanation
A Dampens increase
Foreign growth stronger than domestic, policy removes large 
positive factor for growth of prices.
B Exaggerates increase Foreign growth weaker, policy removes small positive factor.
C Exaggerates increase Policy removes small negative growth factor.
D
Changes from decrease
to increase
Policy removes large negative, keeps small positive factor.
E Dampens decrease Policy removes large negative, keeps small negative factor.
F Exaggerates decrease Policy removes small negative, keeps large negative factor.
G Dampens decrease Policy removes small positive, keeps large negative factor.
H
Changes from increase 
to decrease
Policy removes large positive, keeps small negative factor.
Change in Foreign Demand
Change in 
Domestic
Demand
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Shows  one-
time affect on 
price levels.
Shows  one-
time affect on 
price changes.
Shows  one-
time affect on 
price ratio
that disappears
over time.
Figure 5: Simulation from Standard PV Model
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Policy 
Starts
Policy 
Starts
Policy 
Starts
Shows  
persistent effect 
on price levels.
Shows  
structural 
break in 
price changes.
Shows a 
persistent 
effect on the 
ratio of prices.
Figure 6: Simulation from my Model when Policy causes a Shift
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Policy 
Starts
Policy 
Starts
Policy 
Starts
Shows  
persistent effect 
on price levels, 
where policy 
causes over-
pricing.
Shows  
structural 
break in 
price changes.
Shows a 
persistent 
effect on the 
ratio of prices, 
where the ratio 
increases over 
time.
Figure 7: Simulation from my Model when Policy causes Dampening
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